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Trade Remedy Laws
Alan O. Sykes*
Abstract
This paper is a preliminary draft of a chapter for eventual inclusion in the Handbook of
International Economic Law, edited by Andrew T. Guzman and Alan O. Sykes,
forthcoming from Edward Elgar Publishing. The chapter is a survey of the law and
economics of trade remedy laws, including safeguard actions, antidumping law, and
countervailing duty law. It lays out the central legal obligations of the WTO in each
subject area, and carefully reviews the pertinent economic commentary, both positive
and normative.

The term “trade remedy laws” refers to three types of national laws that impose
import restrictions under specified circumstances. “Safeguard measures” are temporary
trade restrictions, typically tariffs or quotas, which are imposed in response to import
surges that injure or threaten “serious injury” to a competing industry in an importing
nation. “Antidumping duties” are tariffs in addition to ordinary customs duties that are
imposed to counteract certain “unfair” pricing practices by private firms that injure or
threaten to cause “material injury” to a competing industry in an importing nation.
“Countervailing duties” are tariffs in addition to ordinary customs duties that are imposed
to counteract certain subsidies bestowed on exporters by their governments, again when
they cause or threaten to cause material injury to a competing industry.
Such measures under national law are permitted, but not required, by WTO law,
subject to the limitations found in WTO treaty text, including GATT 1994 (hereafter
GATT), the WTO Agreement on Safeguards (hereafter SA), the WTO Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the
Antidumping Agreement, hereafter ADA), and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (hereafter SCMA). These WTO Agreements impose extensive
substantive and procedural restrictions on the use of each type of measure.
This chapter provides an introduction to the law on each trade remedy measure,
and to pertinent economic research and commentary. My emphasis will be on WTO
obligations, to which national laws must conform (in the case of WTO member states). I
make occasional reference to the national law of the United States to illustrate how WTO
*Frank & Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

obligations have been implemented (or not), but will make no attempt at a cross-sectional
survey of variation in national statutes.
I. Safeguard Measures
The heart of the original GATT bargain in 1947 involved the reciprocal reduction
of tariff rates, and negotiated ceilings or “bindings” on tariffs governed by GATT Article
II. The drafters of GATT anticipated that tariff concessions might become unexpectedly
burdensome, however, and provided two principal mechanisms for the adjustment of
tariff commitments. GATT Article XXVIII provides for the renegotiation of tariff
commitments once every three years, as well as for “out of season” renegotiation under
special circumstances authorized by the membership. In addition, the drafters provided
for “emergency action on imports of particular products” in GATT Article XIX, a
provision that addressed unexpected import surges. These “emergency actions” came to
be known as safeguard actions. Article XIX is also often termed the GATT “escape
clause,” as it allows GATT members to “escape” from their tariff commitments (and
other obligations) under specified circumstances.
Perceived deficiencies in Article XIX and in GATT practice pursuant to it led to
the negotiation of the SA during the Uruguay Round. The SA was targeted at extra-legal
or “gray area” substitutes for formal measures under Article XIX, but also introduced
other procedural and substantive obligations.
The possibility of safeguard measures in services sectors has also been
contemplated under WTO law. GATS Article X provides for multilateral negotiations on
the subject. To date, however, the use of safeguards has not become an issue under
GATS, and I will confine my attention here to the issues involving GATT and the SA,
which govern trade in goods.
The key features of the treaty text in GATT and the SA are the subject of Sections
A and B. Section C reviews the important disputes that have arisen over the use of
safeguards to date in the WTO. Section D concludes with a review of the economic
commentary on safeguard measures.
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A. Safeguard Measures under GATT1
Paragraph 1(a) of GATT Article XIX provides:
“If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting
party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly
competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such
product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or
remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw
or modify the concession.”
The basic structure is a simple one. When an unanticipated import surge results from
some obligation under GATT and the import surge is a cause of serious injury or threat
thereof to import-competing firms in the importing nation, the importing nation may
deviate from its obligation temporarily and to the degree necessary to address the injury
due to the import surge.
Article XIX further provides that such deviation from GATT obligations will
come at a price. Paragraph two requires that a party invoking its right to suspend or
modify concessions must notify adversely affected parties and “consult” with them.
Although it does not say so expressly, it was contemplated that such consultations might
lead to an agreement to substitute alternative trade concessions for those withdrawn
because of the import surge—trade “compensation.” Paragraph three provides, however,
that if negotiations over compensation are unsuccessful, the importing nation may deviate
from its obligations nevertheless. In that event, adversely affected trading partners have a
right to suspend “substantially equivalent concessions.” Thus, absent a successful
negotiation over compensation, affected trading partners could retaliate against safeguard
measures, subject to the equivalence requirement. The equivalence requirement was
subject to little policing, however, since collective action by the membership was
necessary to disapprove the level of retaliation, and any such action under the original
GATT required unanimity.

1

Jackson (1969) remains the definitive reference on the treaty text of the original GATT and its
interpretation.
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Over the years, the system devised by Article XIX malfunctioned in two ways.
The first problem arose because the textual requirements of paragraph 1(a) became
increasingly difficult to apply with of the passage of time. The text requires that
safeguard measures respond to the consequences of an “unforeseen development.”
Unforeseen by whom, at what point in time? These questions had a natural answer in
1947—an “unforeseen development” was something unforeseen by the original GATT
negotiators, in 1947 when the original tariff bindings were negotiated. But ten, twenty, or
forty years later, this anchor for the unforeseen developments requirement seemed inapt,
as few things occurring that many years later could have been foreseen in 1947. And if
the anticipations of the original negotiators were no longer the relevant benchmark, what
should substitute for them?
Much the same issue arose with the requirement that the import surge be traceable
to a GATT obligation. Again, the obvious interpretation in 1947 was that the surge had to
result from the 1947 tariff binding. But what of a surge twenty years later? Could any
import surge at that time be fairly said to “result” from a twenty-year old binding? What
if additional bindings had been negotiated in the interim (or not)? Of course, it could
always be argued that but for a tariff binding, the importing nation would have raised its
tariff to prevent the surge. But on that reading, the requirement of linkage to a GATT
obligation would be trivially satisfied for any product covered by a tariff binding.
The eventual response to these textual conundrums was to ignore the text that led
to them. When domestic authority for safeguard measures was included in the U.S. Trade
Act of 1974, for example, the statute made no mention of any requirement to link
increased imports to any unforeseen development, or to any particular GATT obligation,
and indeed U.S. law still omits any reference to these issues.2 Prior to the entry into force
of the treaty establishing the WTO, no nation complained about this state of affairs to my
knowledge.
The demise of these textual prerequisites for safeguard measures created another
problem, however, which I will address in detail below. For now, I simply note that the
requisite inquiry into the “cause” of serious injury or threatened injury under Article XIX
becomes conceptually problematic when there is no longer any “unforeseen
2

See U.S. Trade Act of 1974 §§201 et. seq., codified as 19 U.S.C. §§2251-54.
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development” to serve as an exogenous shock, and thereby to establish a baseline for the
volume of imports and to define the counterfactual for ascertaining whether the import
surge is causally responsible for injury.
The second problem with the system arose because GATT members resorted
increasingly to extra-legal substitutes for safeguard measures, generally negotiated on a
bilateral basis. These arrangements were often termed “orderly marketing” arrangements
or “voluntary export restraints” (VERs). One of the most dramatic examples of the extralegal nature of these measures arose after a safeguards case brought by the U.S.
automotive industry, in which the domestic authority charged with administering the law
(the U.S. International Trade Commission, (ITC)) concluded that the domestic industry
had not met the statutory requirements for safeguard relief. President Carter nevertheless
proceeded to negotiate an export restraint agreement with the Japanese government that
remained in place for a number years.
The economic appeal of these negotiated “gray area” measures was readily
apparent. As noted, nations wishing to use safeguard measures were subject to a
requirement under Article XIX to provide trade compensation lest they suffer retaliation.
VERs afforded compensation in the form of “quota rents”—covered exporters reduced
the quantity of their exports, but because of the quantity restriction they were able to
charge a higher price (the quota rent). Thus, VERs were the rough equivalent of cartel
agreements, in which foreign and domestic industries agreed to restrict overall output in a
national market in order to enjoy the benefits of higher prices.
Although these arrangements proliferated during the later years of GATT, they
were subjected to extensive criticism by economic commentators. See, for example,
Lawrence and Litan (1986). The commentators observed that gray area measures may be
used when the Article XIX preconditions for safeguard measures had not been met, and
that the magnitude and duration of gray area measures was entirely undisciplined. The
political tide turned against these measures during the Uruguay Round, and a substantial
effort was undertaken to put an end to them, culminating in the SA.3

3

Bown (2002) provides additional background on the effort to eliminate extra-legal measures in the
Safeguards Agreement, as well as the puzzle as to why WTO negotiators sought to eliminate such
measures.
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B. The Agreement on Safeguards
The SA introduces a number of innovations. Most prominently, it seeks to end the
use of gray area measures through two devices. The first is a simple prohibition on
them—Article 11(1)(b) provides that “a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any
voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures
on the export or the import side.” Second, to diminish the perceived incentives to resort
to gray area substitutes, the SA alters the rules regarding compensation and retaliation.
All members using safeguards “shall endeavor to maintain a substantially equivalent
level of concessions,”4 i.e., to negotiate trade compensation. But if negotiations over
compensation are unsuccessful, no right of retaliation exists during the first three years of
a safeguard measure that conforms to the legal requirements of the Agreement and that
follows an absolute increase in the level of imports. (Article 8(3)) Thus, the “threat point”
is plainly altered in the compensation negotiations, and nations adversely affected by
safeguards actions must settle for less in compensation lest they walk away with nothing
for three years.
Related, because various measures to protect injured industries dragged on for
years under GATT, the SA introduces some bright-line time limits. Safeguards measures
can last only four years, although they may be extended another four years if a formal
determination is made to justify it. Further, after safeguard measures are once used in an
industry, they cannot be re-applied in that industry for a length of time equal to the time
that they had been in effect. Finally, any safeguard measure lasting over one year is to be
liberalized at “regular intervals.”5
Several other elements of the SA warrant brief mention here. GATT Article XIX
contained no procedural requirements for the imposition of safeguard measures under
national law, and GATT members sometimes used procedures that were not transparent.
Article 3 of the SA now requires an investigation by “competent authorities,” including
notice to all interested parties and “public hearings or other appropriate means” to allow
parties to present evidence and views. The findings of the competent authorities must be
published setting forth “reasoned conclusions” on all matters of law and fact.
4
5

Art. 8(1).
Id. Art. 7.
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Articles 2 and 5 pertain to the so-called issue of “selectivity,” or discrimination in
the use of safeguard measures. Article 2 requires that a measure apply to any imported
product “irrespective of its source.” Article 5 contains rules regarding the use of quotas,
including rules for the allocation of quota shares among supplier countries. Such shares
must be negotiated among all concerned, or else based on market shares during a
“previous representative period,” subject to an exception for disproportionate import
surges from particular sources.
Unlike Article XIX, the SA makes no reference to “unforeseen developments” as
a predicate for safeguard measures, or to the requirement that import surges be linked to
any particular GATT obligation. On the basic preconditions for safeguard measures, the
Agreement simply states that a “Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product
only if that Member has determined...that such product is being imported into its territory
in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry that produces
like or directly competitive products.”6
The only guidance as to the meaning of “serious injury” under this standard, and
on the proper approach to the analysis of causation, is provided by Article 4 of the
Agreement, which states in pertinent part:
1. For purposes of this Agreement:
(a) “serious injury” shall be understood to mean significant overall
impairment in the position of a domestic industry;
(b) “threat of serious injury” shall be understood to mean serious injury that is
clearly imminent...
2. (a) In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or
are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry...the competent
authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable
nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate
and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute
and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased
imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity
utilization, profits and losses, and employment.

6

Id. Art. 2(1).
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(b) The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) shall not be made unless
this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the
existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product
concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than
increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time,
such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.
The next section will address some of the issues that this text leaves open.
C. Issues in Dispute Resolution—WTO Safeguards Cases to Date
The brief exposition of the law above masks a number of difficult issues that have
now surfaced in WTO dispute proceedings. As has been argued elsewhere, WTO case
law in the safeguards area has done little to resolve these issues, and has instead produced
confusion and incoherence. See Horn and Mavroidis (2003), Grossman and Mavroidis
(2004), Grossman and Sykes (2004), Pauwelyn (2004), Sykes (2003), Sykes (2004). This
section briefly reviews the major issues, and notes their (often unsatisfactory) resolution
to date.
Unforeseen Developments and the Effect of the Obligations Incurred. As noted,
GATT practice came to ignore the requirement in Article XIX(1)(a) that any import surge
be linked to unforeseen developments and to particular GATT obligations as a
prerequisite for GATT members to employ safeguard measures. Likewise, the SA made
no mention of these requirements, and it might have been assumed that they would
remain dormant under WTO law. But in its first important ruling in a safeguards
dispute—Korea–Dairy7—the WTO Appellate Body held Article XIX and the Safeguards
Agreement are to be read cumulatively, and that all of the original requirements of
Article XIX remain binding: “[I]it seems to us that the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘as
a result of unforeseen developments’ requires that the developments which led to a
product being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause
or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers must have been ‘unexpected’.
With respect to the phrase ‘of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under
this Agreement, including tariff concessions’, we believe that this phrase simply means
that it must be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, that the importing Member has incurred
7

Korea–Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R (1999).
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obligations under the GATT 1994, including tariff concessions.8” The Appellate Body
went on to endorse the reasoning of the working party report in the old GATT Hatter’s
Fur case, which stated: “‘unforeseen developments’ should be interpreted to mean
developments occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff concession which it
would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country making the
concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the concession was
negotiated.9“ United States–Lamb,10 further held that WTO members must demonstrate
their compliance with these elements of Article XIX prior to the time that a safeguards
measure is undertaken. The U.S. ITC’s failure to consider the matter in its lamb
investigation was “not surprising” given the absence of any reference to it in the
governing U.S. statute, but that was no defense for the United States under WTO law.11
The same problem arose for the United States in the recent steel decision.12
Given the uniform practice of ignoring these issues in the latter years of GATT, it
is questionable whether the drafters of the SA had any intention of reviving them. Having
done so, however, the Appellate Body has done little to resolve the conundrums that led
these parts of the treaty text to be ignored in the first instance. At what point in time must
the events in question have been unforeseen—the time of the last tariff concession? What
if the last concession on the product in question was decades ago—could anything today
have been foreseen? What if the product has been the subject of numerous tariff
concessions over time—are expectations associated with the last concession the only
relevant ones? Why or why not? How does one establish the expectations of trade
negotiators as an evidentiary matter? What if there are many negotiators and their
accounts of their expectations are incongruent? What if most of them are dead? This list
of questions is assuredly incomplete.
Another issue of considerable practical importance concerns the task of
demonstrating the effects of an unforeseen development. How do the competent
authorities determine the degree to which imports have surged as a consequence of it? In
8

Id. ¶84.
Id. ¶89.
10
United States–Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand
and Australia, WT/DS178/AB/R (2001).
11
Id. ¶73.
12
United States–Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248-49, 25154, 258-59/AB/R (November 2003).
9
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the recent steel dispute, the United States asserted before the WTO dispute panel that the
collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Asian financial crisis were both “unforeseen
developments” that had resulted in an import surge. But there was little more than bare
assertion that these events had caused significant import shocks in each of the many steel
product lines or “industries” under investigation. Sykes (2004) reviews the efforts of the
dispute panel in the steel case to come to grips with some of these issues, but the
fundamental problems remain unresolved.
With regard to the “effect of the obligations incurred,” by contrast, the Appellate
Body apparently offers a reading that enables the requirement to be trivially satisfied in
every case—a member simply needs to show that it has incurred some obligations with
respect to the product in question. It is hard to imagine how a dispute could arise without
such an obligation, since a member with an unbound tariff could always raise it
unilaterally without any need to rely on a safeguard measure.
Increased Quantities. Article XIX allows safeguard measures when a “product is
being imported…in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten serious injury.” To ascertain whether imports have increased, of course, some
baseline must be used. The original baseline for Article XIX was the volume of trade in
1947. But with the passage of time, that baseline became increasingly absurd, since
global trade in most products had since increased dramatically. The other obvious
baseline might have been the volume of trade on the date of the “unforeseen
development” that produced the import surge, but since that prerequisite for safeguards
measures had long been ignored under GATT, it did not supply a baseline in practice
either.
In Argentina–Footwear,13 the Appellate Body considered a case in which
Argentina had adopted the approach embraced some years earlier by the U.S. ITC—a
five-year “rule of thumb” for establishing the import baseline. The Appellate Body
concluded that the phrase “is being imported” requires “the competent authorities to
examine recent imports, and not simply trends in imports during the past five years—or,
for that matter, during any other period of several years.”14 “[N]ot just any increased

13
14

Argentina–Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999).
Id.
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quantities of imports will suffice. There must be ‘such increased quantities’ as to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry in order to fulfill this
requirement for applying a safeguard measure….[T]he increase in imports must have
been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause ‘serious injury’.”15
Thus, the Appellate Body insists that imports must have increased “recently.” But
how recently, and in what amount? The phrase “recent enough, sudden enough, sharp
enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten
to cause ‘serious injury’” hardly provides useful guidance. The insistence on “not just any
increase” but “such increased quantities” as to cause injury is equally unhelpful. Indeed,
as I will detail in a moment, it is not even clear what it means to say that increased
imports are a “cause” of injury.
Serious Injury. Like Article XIX and the SA, the Appellate Body has not
attempted to define “serious injury” with any precision. Its focus has been primarily on
the text of Article 4.2, which simply provides: “the competent authorities shall evaluate
all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the
situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of
the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market
taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity,
capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment.” According to the Appellate
Body, the text requires that all of the listed factors be “evaluated” in every case, and it
has found safeguard measures wanting under WTO law whenever a member has failed to
discuss one or more of these factors in its official report on safeguard action.16 The
Appellate Body has further held that the obligation to evaluate “all relevant factors” may
extend to factors not raised by any of the parties to the safeguards investigation.17
Otherwise, the Appellate Body has simply insisted that serious injury represents
“significant overall impairment” as stated in Article 4.1 of the Safeguards Agreement. It

15

Id. ¶131.
See Argentina–Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999), ¶121.
17
See United States–Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European
Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R (2001), ¶55.
16
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characterizes this standard as “high” and “exacting.18“ It is not necessary that every
“relevant factor” reflect industrial decline, however, for serious injury to be present—”a
certain factor may not be declining, but the overall picture may nevertheless demonstrate
‘significant overall impairment.’19“ Beyond a requirement that all factors listed in the
Safeguards Agreement be “evaluated” in each case, however, it remains unclear what
conditions will support a finding of serious injury or threat, and what degree of deference
on the matter will be afforded to national authorities.
Causation. As originally drafted. Article XIX contemplated that the conjunction
of an “unforeseen development” with new GATT constraints on national trade policy
might lead to an import surge that caused or threatened serious injury. The causal
variable in this chain, or the exogenous shock in economic parlance, was the “unforeseen
development.” The economic logic of this test is clear, although to be sure it begs the
question of what counts as an unforeseen development, and how its impact is to be
demonstrated.
Because GATT practice came to ignore the unforeseen developments
requirement, however, member states wishing to use safeguard measures had to employ a
different conceptual framework to assess the causal impact of imports. United States law
took the lead, and under the Trade Act of 1974 it simply asks whether increased
quantities of imports cause or threaten serious injury.20 The difficulty with this inquiry
from the standpoint of economic logic is that import quantities are not a causal or
exogenous variable—they are endogenous and result from other forces.
For example, if imports and domestic products are perfect substitutes, then the
quantity of imports will simply equal the difference between domestic demand and
domestic supply at the equilibrium price. Within this framework, the exogenous factors
are the determinants of domestic supply, domestic demand, and the import supply curve.
Domestic demand is affected by such things as consumer tastes and incomes; domestic
supply by the costs of inputs into production and the state of available production
18

United States–Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand
and Australia WT/DS178/AB/R (2001), ¶124.
19
Argentina–Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999), ¶139.
20
See 19 U.S.C. §2251(a). U.S. law actually asks whether increased quantities are a “substantial cause,”
defined as a cause no less important than any other. For more detail on this test and its operation under U.S.
law, see Sykes (2003), (2004).
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technology; and import supply by factors affecting supply and demand in other countries.
The quantity of imports is then a result of the interaction of these forces; it is not a causal
variable at all. Likewise, changes in the quantity of imports will be the result of changes
in the determinants of domestic supply, demand and the world price. Increased quantities
of imports may result, for example, from a fall in the world price due to falling input
costs abroad, to improved production technology abroad, or to weakening demand
abroad. Increased quantities of imports can also result from an increase in domestic
demand attributable, for example, to rising consumer incomes. Finally, increased
quantities of imports can result from increasing costs of domestic production reflected in
a leftward shift of the domestic supply schedule.
Against this backdrop, the question “did increased quantities of imports cause
serious injury to a domestic industry?” is largely incoherent. Suppose, as an illustration,
that the domestic industry suffers a decline due to rising costs. As domestic production
falls at the world price, imports will increase to fill the rising gap between domestic
demand and supply. Are “increased quantities” of imports the “cause” of this “injury?”
Certainly not in any intelligible sense of the term “cause.” By hypothesis, what changed
are the costs of domestic firms, and that change resulted in reduced domestic production
and increased imports.
The decision by the Appellate Body to resurrect the unforeseen developments
requirement can offer at least conceptual solution to this problem, by reframing the
question as one of whether the imports that resulted from the exogenous “unforeseen
development” are the cause of actual or threatened injury. The practical challenges of
making such a showing might be considerable, and it would remain to determine what
should “count” as an unforeseen development, but at least the issue would be framed
coherently. Puzzlingly, however, this is not the approach that the Appellate Body has
taken to date.
Argentina–Footwear briefly addresses the proper method for determining whether
imports are the “cause” of injury. The dispute panel in the case concluded that “if
causation is present, an increase in imports normally should coincide with a decline in the
relevant injury factors.21“ The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that “in an analysis
21

Argentina–Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (1999), ¶141.
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of causation, ‘it is the relationship between the movements in imports (volume and
market share) and the movements in injury factors that must be central to a causation
analysis and determination.’ Furthermore, with respect to a ‘coincidence’ between an
increase in imports and a decline in the relevant injury factors, we note that the Panel
simply said that this should ‘normally’ occur if causation is present.”22
Hence, in its first important statement on the subject, the Appellate Body holds
that the principal way to determine whether increased imports are the cause of injury is
simply to look for a correlation between rising import volumes and indicators of decline
in the domestic import-competing industry. It tips its hat to the familiar statistical
distinction between correlation and causation, but sweeps it under the rug. One has no
sense that the Appellate Body is aware of (or at least troubled by) the profound
conceptual difficulty in confounding the two in a setting where the ostensible “causal”
variable is in fact endogenous.
The other Appellate Body opinions on causal analysis focus principally on the socalled “nonattribution requirement” of Article 4.2 of the Safeguards Agreement, which
provides that safeguard measures may not be employed unless the “investigation
demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between
increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When
factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the
same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.” One question raised
by this language during the course of various disputes has been whether the harm
“caused” by increased imports (again suspending the issue of what it means to treat
increased imports as causal) must by itself suffice to cause serious injury, or must simply
contribute to serious injury, perhaps along with other factors. To this ill-posed question,
the Appellate Body has responded that “the SA does not require that increased imports be
“sufficient” to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury. Nor does that Agreement
require that increased imports “alone” be capable of causing, or threatening to cause,
serious injury.”23
22

Id. ¶144.
United States–Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand
and Australia WT/DS178/AB/R (2001), ¶170. See also United States–Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities WT/DS166/AB/R (2001), ¶70.
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Although increased imports need not account for all of the serious injury, the
Appellate Body nevertheless underscores the importance of ensuring that injury caused
by “factors other than increased imports” “not be attributed to increased imports.” To
make sense of these dual principles, one can only assume that the Appellate Body is
concerned about situations in which increased imports have not made any causal
contribution to serious injury, and where serious injury is nevertheless wrongly
“attributed” to imports. It has found fault with members’ “nonattribution analysis” on
multiple occasions, generally because the reasoning was deemed inadequately clear.24
Among the difficult issues posed by the nonattribution requirement of the SA is
the identification of what constitutes a “factor other than increased imports.” In line with
the earlier illustration, suppose that an increase in the costs of domestic firms leads to an
increase in imports. Is the cost increase a “factor other than increased imports?” Is that
view coherent when the “other factor” was actually the cause of the increased imports, as
posited? At this writing, the Appellate Body has given no indication that it even
understands the complex issues of economic causality raised by the SA. Sykes (2003) and
(2004) provide further discussion of the conceptual difficulties with causation analysis
under the SA and the unsatisfactory state of Appellate Body opinions on the matter to
date.
Several economic commentators have proposed ways to make the causation
analysis in safeguards proceedings more coherent. The predominant suggestion is that
national authorities should inquire whether shifts in the import supply curve have caused
serious injury or threat, as opposed to shifts in domestic demand and supply conditions.
See Grossman (1986); Kelly (1988); and Irwin (2003). Pindyck and Rotemberg (1987)
offer another suggestion based on counterfactual quotas that freeze import quantities at
some baseline level, and analogous counterfactual assumptions to assess the quantitative
impact of “other factors.” To date, however, national authorities have shown little
inclination to embrace either approach, and the receptiveness of the Appellate Body to
either approach remains untested.
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A final important issue that as yet has received little attention from the Appellate
Body concerns the task of determining which domestic firms are relevant for purposes of
injury analysis. SA Art. 2 follows GATT Art. XIX in stating that the serious injury or
threat thereof must be suffered by the domestic industry that produces “like or directly
competitive products.” The question of how to “define the industry” under this standard
often receives much attention from the competent authorities during their investigation—
in the recent steel safeguard investigation in the United States, for example, the U.S. ITC
ultimately determined that 27 separate steel product “industries” were involved, and
conducted a separate analysis of each. Although some of the WTO safeguard disputes
have included challenges to the definition of “industry” by competent authorities, most
have been resolved largely on other grounds.
D. An Economic Perspective on Safeguard Measures
Sykes (1991) reviews the possible justifications for safeguard measures, and
rejects most of them. Plainly, safeguard measures afford protection to industries that have
difficulty meeting foreign competition. They delay the contraction of those industries,
and impede the transfer of resources from declining industries to others where
comparative advantage may lie. At first blush, therefore, safeguard measures seem quite
problematic from the standpoint of economic efficiency.
Industrial proponents of safeguards most often argue that they are need for
troubled industries to restore their competitiveness—a temporary period of protection
will afford firms with profits to finance new investments, the argument runs, so that they
can again compete in global markets. A difficulty with this argument is that it is often
impossible for declining industries to restore their competitiveness through new
investment, which would simply entail throwing good money after bad. In addition, there
is little reason to think that national governments have the ability to identify industries
that can become competitive “again” very reliably. And if governments can do it, why do
the capital markets not do it as well and lend firms the money to finance worthwhile
investments without the need for temporary protection?
From the standpoint of economic efficiency, therefore, safeguard measures appear
highly questionable, at least at first blush. If this observation is correct, however, a puzzle
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arises from a positive economic standpoint—why does the WTO system provide for
safeguard measures nevertheless? Commentators have suggested several answers to this
puzzle.
Safeguards as “Compensation.” The distributional consequences of trade
liberalization are uneven. Some groups will benefit, and others will lose, even if the
aggregate effect on economic welfare is positive. It is sometimes suggested that
safeguard measures may serve a mechanism for compensating some of the groups
disadvantaged by trade.25
One difficulty with this claim is that trade protection is an extremely costly and
clumsy device for compensating the “losers” from trade liberalization. To a great extent,
it may simply benefit diversified shareholders in protected industries, doing little for
individuals whose job have been sacrificed for the broader public good. Targeted
unemployment and retraining programs seem a much more tailored response. Second,
and related, it is not clear that safeguard measures will “compensate” for trade-related
dislocation in any meaningful sense. Depending on how they are implemented, they may
simply postpone the burden of dislocation as noted. Finally, it seems clear from the text
of Article XIX that safeguards were not conceived as a general compensation
mechanism. They were to be employed only when “unforeseen developments” led to
import-related dislocation. In perhaps most cases, however, the dislocation associated
with trade liberalization is quite expectable, and indeed it is the anticipated competitive
advantage from trade concessions that leads exporters to encourage their political
officials to secure better access to foreign markets. If distributional equity were the goal
of safeguards, it is perhaps a puzzle as to why measures to achieve it would have been
limited to the situations in which dislocation was unforeseen.
Adjustment Costs and Orderly Contraction. Proponents of safeguard measures
sometimes argue that temporary protection is needed to facilitate “orderly contraction.”
Implicitly, the claim is that without protection the industry will collapse precipitously,
leading to unnecessary unemployment and dislocation. This argument has received some
credence from economic commentators. See Horn and Mavroidis (2003), Sykes (1990).
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Horn and Mavroidis focus on the costs of unemployed factors of production (most
notably labor), and suggest that measures to slow the pace of industry contraction may,
under certain conditions, reduce these costs. They begin by acknowledging that nothing is
gained by a safeguards measure that simply postpones the costs of adjustment without
reducing them, incurring the economic costs of protectionism in the process. But it is
possible to imagine that protection can reduce adjustment costs and not merely postpone
them. As an example, they posit a declining industry in which 12,000 workers will lose
their jobs each month. They further imagine that suitable positions for those workers will
open up in another industry, but only at the rate of 6,000 per month. By slowing the rate
of layoffs in the declining industry to 6,000 per month in this scenario, safeguard
measures can avoid the unemployment that results when 12,000 laid-off workers a month
have only 6,000 new jobs open to them.
Horn and Mavroidis concede that such problems will only arise under limited
conditions. In particular, why do workers in the declining industry suffer unemployment
if they have no alternative job opportunity, rather than taking whatever wage cuts are
necessary for them to retain their positions? And if the supply of unemployed workers to
other industries is greater than the demand at current wages, why do wages in other
industries not fall to accommodate more hires? In a well-functioning labor market with
wage flexibility, unemployment should reflect an efficient period of job search rather
than an inefficient idling of resources. But there are reasons why wage adjustments may
not clear the labor market efficiently. Horn and Mavroidis note the possibility that labor
unions may resist wage cuts. Another possibility is that government safety net programs
provide income subsidies that discourage workers from seeking new jobs as quickly as
they might. One can perhaps imagine other reasons, and thus it is certainly possible in
theory that industries may contract “too quickly” and that measures to slow the rate of
contraction may be useful, other things being equal.
It would not necessarily follow that safeguard measures are the best policy
response, however, as Horn and Mavroidis also acknowledge. Various other policy
instruments might be employed to address the problem, such as subsidies to encourage
the hiring of the unemployed. But all instruments are imperfect, and it is perhaps
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conceivable that measures to protect a declining industry that slow its rate of contraction
may at times be the best option.
Does this possibility afford a convincing justification for safeguards under WTO
law? The difficulty with this account is that nothing in the structure of WTO law (or in
the national laws) limits safeguard measures to circumstances in which they might
usefully slow the process of contraction. Sykes (1990) makes the point that U.S. law
permits safeguards in a far broader set of circumstances, and it is clear that WTO law
does as well. Neither body of law requires any showing that an industry is exhibiting
inefficiently high levels of unemployment of labor or any other factor of production,
much less evidence that temporary protection can do more than merely postpone the
problem.
The Political Economy Rationale for Safeguard Measures. In my judgment, the
most convincing explanation for the presence of safeguards in the WTO system lies in the
realm of political economy. Treaties are contracts of a sort, and the direct parties in
interest are political officials. The officials who negotiate and ratify treaties may be
expected to design provisions that serve their joint political interests, which may or may
not coincide with economic welfare, conventionally defined. Because treaties are
negotiated under conditions of uncertainty, it is in the interest of political officials to
include provisions that allow them to adjust the bargain when its obligations become
politically onerous, much as private contracting parties permit deviation from contractual
commitments under circumstances where their performance has become economically
onerous (as through clauses excusing nonperformance due to acts of war or force
majeure). Several commentators have advanced theories of safeguard measures that
locate them squarely within this framework.
Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 2002) suggest that safeguard measures are allowed
because the temptation to cheat on tariff commitments can become acute in response to
short-term import surges. In their model, the temptation arises because following an
import surge, a tariff increase affords a larger terms of trade gain to the importing nation.
If a tariff increase under these circumstances were defined as a breach of agreement,
other nations would retaliate, cooperation might unravel and the long-term benefits of the
trade agreement might be lost. The parties to trade agreements recognize this problem

20

and allow each other to “cheat” in these short-term situations to preserve long-term
cooperation.
Sykes (1991) offers a slightly different argument, which rests on the observation
that the political pressure to protect industries in severe decline is often acute. One
explanation is that in declining industries, both firms and workers have made sunk
investments on which the rates of return have fallen below competitive levels. If they are
able to obtain protection that raises prices, they will retain the benefits for themselves—
no competitive entry will occur unless returns exceed the competitive level. Accordingly,
they will lobby harder for protection than other industries in which the benefits of
protection would be competed away. Likewise, if protection for a declining industry
harms foreign exporters who are highly profitable and growing, they will tend to raise
less political objection to it because their prosperity would often be competed away in
any event. It may then be in the mutual political interest of parties to trade agreements to
allow each other to reimpose protection to help an industry that is in severe decline due to
some shock that also leaves its foreign competitors prosperous and expanding—arguably,
the circumstances contemplated by Article XIX. This line of analysis also provides an
explanation as to why Article XIX should be designed to provide temporary rather than
permanent protection for declining industries. Such industries will tend to become a less
potent lobby for protection over time as existing physical and human capital depreciates,
and the returns to sunk investments that are lost due to foreign competition diminish.
Bagwell and Staiger (2005) extend their prior work to consider a related situation
in which governments face uncertainty about future political pressures for protection, and
where the degree of domestic pressure that they face cannot be observed by other
governments (private information). Here again, it may be in the mutual interest of the
parties to trade agreements to allow each other to deviate from commitments when the
domestic pressure to do so is high in an importing nation, but they must also worry that
trading partners may deviate opportunistically because domestic political pressure is
unobservable by others. A partial solution to this problem is to limit the number of times
that nations may deviate from commitments in a given industry—governments will be
less tempted to cheat by deviating when political pressure to do so is low, for fear of
losing their right to deviate in the future when pressure is high. This observation suggests
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an explanation for one feature of the SA noted earlier—safeguard measures cannot be
used in an industry that has used them in the past, for a length of time equal to the time
that they were in place.
These analyses also have interesting normative implications. The Bagwell and
Staiger framework suggests that without a safeguards mechanism, cheating on trade
agreements might become acute and cooperation might unravel, denying trading nations
the long-term benefits of trade liberalization. Sykes further emphasizes how the
opportunity to deviate from commitments when the pressure to do so is high may make
trade negotiators more comfortable about making trade concessions in the first instance, a
point also noted in Dam (1970). The economic welfare effects of the safeguards
mechanism then depend on the balance between the economic welfare gains associated
with more trade concessions ex ante, and the economic costs associated with renewed
protection under the safeguards mechanism ex post. The ex post welfare consequences of
the safeguards mechanism also depend importantly on the extent to which nations
negotiate trade compensation when they employ safeguards measures, or instead trigger
trade retaliation.
II. Antidumping Duties
Antidumping duties are by far the most frequently used measure in the trade
remedy arsenal. The WTO website reports the initiation of over 2500 investigations
between 1995 and June, 1994. Exporters in the People’s Republic of China have been the
most frequent targets of antidumping complaints. Other frequent targets include exporters
in Korea, Taiwan, and the United States.
“Dumping” entails a decision by an exporter, usually a private firm, to sell abroad
at an “unfairly” low price. The benchmark for what constitutes a “fair” price, generally
termed the “normal value,” and the task of ascertaining the magnitude of dumping, is a
principal subject of this section. Before antidumping duties may be employed as a
countermeasure against dumping, however, WTO law also requires that dumped imports
be a cause of actual or threatened injury to competing firms in the importing nation. This
“injury test” will also be a focus of attention. Section A provides a brief pre-GATT
history of antidumping law. Section B concerns the existence and magnitude of dumping
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under modern WTO law and practice, while Section C addresses the injury test. Section
D concludes with a review of economic commentary regarding the logic and wisdom of
antidumping law. In contrast to the safeguards area, WTO Appellate Body decisions to
date in antidumping disputes largely concern narrow technical or procedural points, and I
will not devote a section to them although I will mention a few rulings in passing.
A. The Genesis of Antidumping Law
The first antidumping law was enacted by Canada in 1904. As amended in 1907,
it provided that any imported article, of a class or kind also manufactured in Canada,
would be assessed an additional duty (subject to a cap) whenever the price charged for
the article in Canada, less the costs of shipment to Canada, was less than the price of the
article in the exporter’s home market.26
The Canadian legislation was proposed in a budget speech by the Minister of
Finance, who offered the following justification for it:
“We find today that the high tariff countries have adopted that method of trade
which has now come to be known as...dumping; that is to say, that the trust or
combine, having obtained command and control of its own market and finding
that it will have a surplus of goods, sets out to obtain command of a neighboring
market, and for the purpose of obtaining control of a neighboring market will put
aside all reasonable considerations with regard to the cost or fair price of the
goods; the only principle recognized is that the goods must be sold and the market
obtained...They send the goods here with the hope and expectation that they will
crush out the native Canadian industries. And with the Canadian industries
crushed out, what would happen? The end of cheapness would come, and the
beginning of dearness would be at hand.”27
The passage reflects a concern for what we might today term predatory pricing, or
monopolization, under national antitrust laws.
After Canada enacted its antidumping law, antidumping policy quickly spread.
Australia included antidumping measures as part of its unfair business practices law in
1906 (although with a more antitrust-like procedure for setting cases in motion and
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deciding them), and the Union of South Africa followed with an antidumping law
substantially the same as Canada’s in 1914.
The Antidumping Act of 1916 Act in the United States, still on the books at this
writing,28 makes it “unlawful for any person...to import, sell or cause to be
imported...articles within the United States at a price substantially less than the actual
market value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the United
States, in the principal markets of their country of production, or of other countries to
which they are commonly exported...[if] such act or acts be done with the intent of
destroying or injuring an industry in the Untied States.”29 Criminal penalties attach to
violations, and injured parties may sue for treble damages. This Act has been construed to
require much the same showing as a predatory pricing case under the U.S. antitrust laws,
and has been little used throughout its history.
The U.S. Antidumping Act of 1921, now subsumed in the Tariff Act of 1930,
embraced antidumping duties as a countermeasure against dumping, thus moving
American law in the direction of Canada’s statute. And unlike the 1916 Act, it requires
no showing of predatory design, simply a showing that dumped imports cause or threaten
“material injury.” Much of the substance and procedure of the antidumping provisions of
the Tariff Act of 1930 have been imported wholesale into WTO antidumping law.
B. GATT and the ADA—Identifying and Quantifying Dumping
In the course of negotiations over the creation of an International Trade
Organization during the 1940’s, the United States proposed to include a provision in the
ITO charter to regulate antidumping measures. A modified version of the U.S. proposal
was incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as Article VI.
As far as one can tell from historical accounts, the drafters of the GATT did not discuss
the policy behind antidumping measures at length. Rather, it was accepted at the time that
national antidumping legislation was permissible, and the goal was to constrain its use to
28
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avoid a proliferation of antidumping measures that would frustrate the market access
expectations created by the reciprocal tariff concessions of GATT.30 Additional discipline
over antidumping measures was introduced in the 1960’s with the conclusion of the first
GATT Antidumping Code. The Code was revised during the Tokyo Round, and after
further changes became the ADA during the Uruguay Round.31
Note that GATT members are under no obligation to prevent their exporters from
engaging in dumping, and of course WTO/GATT law does not bind private exporters.
GATT Article VI(1) simply provides that “dumping, by which products of one country
are introduced into another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be
condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry…or
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.” The remedy for dumping,
however, lies entirely with the importing country, in the form of antidumping duties, “not
greater in amount than the margin of dumping.” GATT Art. VI(2). In this section, I
address the task of determining whether dumping exists, and of measuring its magnitude
(the “margin of dumping”). Injury will be considered in the next section.
Antidumping investigations proceed in several stages. The first stage, “initiation,”
generally involves a petition from a domestic industry alleging that dumping and injury
(or threat) are present and setting forth evidence in support of that claim.32 If the
investigating authorities find the evidence presented to be both accurate and adequate, a
formal investigation will begin. They will then gather further information from both
exporters and domestic petitioners regarding the existence of dumping and injury, and
will commonly make preliminary determinations on these issues. If the preliminary
determinations are “affirmative” on both issues, provisional duties may be imposed.33
After affirmative preliminary determinations, there may also be an opportunity for a
settlement of sorts in the form of a price undertaking from exporters. Absent a settlement,
the investigating authorities will next proceed to audit the information provided to them
by exporters for accuracy, and to entertain further arguments from all interested parties
regarding the magnitude of dumping and the injury issue. Ultimately, they must make
30
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final determinations on the dumping and injury questions, and if both determinations are
affirmative, the investigating authorities will impose definitive antidumping duties. Note
that the ADA contains a de minimis rule, and forbids duties when the margin of dumping
is less than two percent of the export price.34
On the existence and magnitude of dumping, Article VI(1) states that an exported
product is sold below “normal value” when its price (a) “is less than the comparable
price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption
in the exporting country, or, (b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the
ordinary course of trade, or (ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of
origin plus a reasonable allowance for selling cost and profit.” Thus, an export price may
be judged a dumping price with reference to three benchmarks: the “comparable” price of
the like product sold by the exporter in its home market in the “ordinary course of trade;”
the “comparable” price of the like product sold by the exporter to a third country in the
“ordinary course of trade;” and what is generally termed the “constructed value” of the
good, which is equal to its “cost of production” plus a reasonable allowance for general,
selling and administrative expenses and profit. In turn, the “margin of dumping” will
equal the difference between the price of the exported good, adjusted as necessary to
make it “comparable,” and one of these three benchmarks. This same basic approach,
now considerably elaborated, is now contained in Article 2 of the ADA.
Several remarks are in order about the use of these benchmarks in practice and
under the ADA. First, importing nations are not free to pick and choose among the
benchmarks. The preferred benchmark is the “comparable” price of the “like product”
sold by the exporter in its home market. Importing nations may use another benchmark
only when home market sales do not establish a reliable benchmark. Why might this
problem arise? The obvious possibility is that the exporter in question does not sell the
“like product” in its home market. ADA 2.6 defines “like product” as “a product which is
identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of
such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has
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characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.” If the
exporter does not sell an identical product in the home market, therefore, it is permissible
to use the price of a similar product to establish the benchmark. Adjustments to the price
must then be made to account for differences between the products—if the product sold
at home is more expensive to produce, for example, one might expect it to sell for a
higher price, and it would be inappropriate to conclude that dumping is present simply
because the product sold in the home market has a higher cost of production. These
adjustments can become complex, and may rest on shaky assumptions about cost
differences. At some point, the dissimilarities between products may become so great that
confident adjustments are impossible. And in some cases, an exporter simply does not
sell any plausibly “similar” products at home. The importing nation must then turn to one
of the other benchmarks.
A related problem may arise when the exporter has some home market sales of a
“like product,” but they are very small in number.35 A possible concern in such cases is
that the exporter may be manipulating home market sale prices downward simply to
avoid a finding of dumping, so that the home-market benchmark becomes unreliable.
That concern also arises when home market sales are made to a related company and may
not reflect arm’s-length pricing.36 Prices charged between related parties may be
manipulated with an eye on the antidumping laws, and need not be used as the basis for
comparisons.37 Sometimes this problem can be solved by looking further down the chain
of distribution to subsequent arm’s-length sales, but such transactions may not always be
available.
Lastly, it is permissible to disregard home market sales as being outside the
“ordinary course of trade” if they are made “below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of
production plus administrative, selling and general costs,” if they are also made over an
“extended period of time” and in “substantial quantities.”38 After such sales are
disregarded, there may be no sales left in the home market, or too few of them to
establish a reliable benchmark.
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If the home market benchmark cannot be used, the ADA makes clear that the next
preferred alternative is the “comparable price” on the “like product” sold to a third
country.39 The importing nation is free to select the third country to use for this
benchmark when more than one are plausible candidates, and will often choose the one
that yields the highest benchmark (and thus the highest margin of dumping). The thirdcountry benchmark may prove unusable, however, for essentially the same reasons as the
home-market benchmark—there may be no sales of like products to third countries, they
may be very few in number or made to related parties, or they may be below cost. In that
event, the importing nation must turn to the third benchmark, constructed value.
Second, in the price-to-price cases (home-market or third-country benchmark), it
is essential to compare prices at the same “level of trade”—a comparison of “apples to
apples.” The ADA deems it inappropriate to compare the retail price in one country, for
example, with the wholesale price in another. ADA 2.4 requires a price comparison
“normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the
same time.” This requirement necessitates an additional set of price adjustments beyond
those for any physical differences between the “like product” and the imported product
noted earlier. Typically, for example, an importing nation may have information on the
delivered prices of imported goods. It must then deduct built-in costs like freight and
insurance to work back to the ex-factory prices, and may be required to make the same
adjustments to home-market or third country prices. These adjustments become even
more extensive when sales to related parties are present, and the investigating authorities
must look farther down the chain of distribution to find an arm’s-length price with which
to begin the analysis.
The desire to compare apples to apples in the price-to-price cases can necessitate
a range of other adjustments as well. For example, suppose that sales in one market are to
large customers who negotiate quantity discounts in the ordinary course, while sales in
another market are to small customers who do not receive discounts. Or suppose that
goods are marketed in different ways in different markets, with considerable differences
in selling expenses. Many other factors might be imagined that affect the prices of the
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goods in question,40 and that must be made the subject of an adjustment lest dumping be
found (or not) even though, from the seller’s perspective, the same net price is being
charged to comparable buyers.
Third, certain additional adjustments are required by GATT law to avoid
impermissible findings of dumping. Article VI(5) provides that if a product benefits from
an export subsidy, so that the export price is below the home-market price by the amount
of the subsidy, and if that product is subject to a countervailing duty as a result, it cannot
also be subjected to an antidumping duty to counteract the price differential as dumping
(and vice-versa). In an antidumping case, therefore, the amount of a countervailing duty
imposed on the same good to counteract an export subsidy will be added into the price of
the exported good to reduce the margin of dumping and prevent a “doubling up” of the
duties. Likewise, Article VI(4) prohibits antidumping duties where the price differential
results from a rebate on exportation, or an exemption for exports, for certain qualifying
taxes. Visitors to Europe, for example, may recall the opportunity to obtain a refund of
the VAT on goods that they purchase in Europe and take home with them. The same
rebate is available to firms who export from Europe. The VAT is built in to the price of
goods in Europe, and so if the price for exports were calculated net of the VAT refund, it
would be lower than the home market price by that amount and dumping would appear to
be present. To avoid such a result, VAT refunds and certain other qualifying rebates or
exemptions will be added to the price of the exported good to reduce the margin of
dumping. It bears emphasis that not all taxes qualify for rebate or exemption, which has
sparked a longstanding debate over whether particular tax systems (such as a VAT)
create an advantage for exporters in international trade.41
Fourth, the computation of dumping margins requires some method for
comparing and averaging data. Dumping investigations may involve vast number of
transactions, both in the importing nation and the home country or third country market,
and the ADA provides three possible ways for the information from the pertinent
transactions to be aggregated to produce a dumping margin. The first is to compute a
weighted average of the export prices, to be compared with a weighted average of the
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home-market or third-country transactions. The second is to compare export prices and
home market prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis, and then to create an average of
these individual comparisons to establish the dumping margin. Under limited
circumstances, dumping margins may also be based on a comparison of individual export
transaction prices with a weighted average of home-market or third-country prices.42 As
of yet, the Appellate Body has said little about when these different comparison methods
can or should be used, and the ADA itself provides only modest guidance.43
An issue relating to the comparison that has surfaced repeatedly in dispute
proceedings concerns the practice of “zeroing.” As a simple illustration, imagine that an
importing nation is using the transaction-to-transaction method, and imagine a total of
four sales of identical products, two in home market and two in the importing nation. In
month one, a home-market sale occurs at $4 and an export sale at $5. In month two, a
home-market sale occurs at $5 and an export sale at $4. The average of the two sales in
each market is $4.50. With “zeroing,” however, the investigating authorities conclude
that there is no dumping in month one, and the margin of dumping for that month is set at
zero. They conclude that a dumping margin of $1 is present in month two. The margin of
dumping is then computed to be ($0+$1)/2 = $.50, even though a comparison of the
average home-market price with the average export price would yield a zero margin of
dumping. The same issue can easily arise when the importing nation compares weightedaverage normal value prices to individual export transaction prices. Less transparently, it
can also arise in weighted-average to weighted-average comparisons because in many
cases, investigating authorities will break down the products under investigation into subcategories for purposes of comparability, and the practice of zeroing across the subcategories will have a similar effect when the data from the subcategories are reaggregated to produce a “weighted average of the weighted averages.” In the cases
decided thus far, the Appellate Body has ruled against the practice of zeroing, although it
has not yet confronted all conceivable scenarios in which it might be used.44
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Fifth, although dumping is a practice in which individual firms engage, firms
involved in dumping cases may or may not be aggregated for the purpose of computing a
dumping margin. Antidumping cases generally encompass all of the exports of covered
products from a given country, not just those of selected exporters. The ADA states that,
“as a rule,” investigating authorities should determine individual dumping margins for
each exporter.45 But where that becomes impracticable because large numbers of
exporters are involved, the investigating authorities may instead employ statistically valid
samples, or may investigate the exporters supplying the largest percentage of the volume
of exports that it is reasonably practicable to investigate. Exporters who desire to be
investigated individually but who are excluded from the sample chosen by the
investigating authorities may submit individual information to the authorities nonetheless,
who must then determine an individual margin if the information is sufficient and the task
is not unduly burdensome or time consuming. Exporters who are not individually
investigated will be subject to antidumping duties based on averages for the exporters
who are investigated.46
Sixth, any examination of dumping is necessarily based on information about past
transactions or costs, but antidumping duties are applied going forward after dumping is
found (if injury is also found as discussed below), and WTO law requires that such duties
“not exceed the margin of dumping.” What ensures that duties applied to future
transactions will not exceed the margin of dumping, when that margin is calculated on
the basis of historical information? The ADA provides for two approaches to the
assessment of duties, “retrospective” and “prospective.”47 Both approaches must be
designed to ensure that exporters have an opportunity to receive refunds for any duty paid
in excess of the actual margin of dumping. In the U.S. system, for example, the
Commerce Department will conduct an administrative review periodically to examine the
transactions to which an antidumping duty has been applied. Excess duties are refunded,
and if the margin of dumping has increased the importer of record will be responsible for
the difference.
45
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It may occur to the reader to ask why an exporter would ever continue dumping
once subject to an antidumping duty—why not cease dumping, and then collect a full
refund of antidumping duties paid down the road (or allow one’s customers to collect the
refund)? One answer is that to obtain a full refund, the exporter must raise its price to
offset the margin of dumping, while its customers pay in addition the full antidumping
duty for a period of time until the issue of a refund is adjudicated. Customers may simply
turn elsewhere. In addition, as noted below, a full refund may be far from a certainty,
because many factors make it difficult for exporters to know by how much they will be
found to be dumping.
Seventh, an exporter can only dump in an importing nation if it is aware that its
goods are being sold to that nation. For example, suppose that an exporter sells its goods
to a trading company without knowledge as to where the trading company will resell
them, and the goods are later resold by the trading company at different prices in different
national markets. In this chain of distribution, only the trading company can engage in
dumping, not the original exporter. Likewise, when goods are sold by a company in
country A to another company in country B without knowledge as to their ultimate
destination, and the second company then re-exports them to country C, only the
company in country B can engage in dumping, and its resale price in country B would
provide the relevant home-market benchmark.48
Eighth, even though dumping in principle involves a deliberate decision by a firm
to sell to the importing nation at a price below the pertinent benchmark, firms often
“dump” by accident. As should now be clear, the computation of a dumping margin is a
complicated undertaking. Complex price adjustments are required, which may be based
on controversial assumptions about costs and cost allocation. Averaging methods may be
used that can inflate apparent dumping, and the time period for price comparisons can be
chosen strategically to maximize the evidence of dumping as well. If the constructed
value benchmark is used, investigating authorities may assess the cost of production and
the additional expenses that may be added to constructed value using data that a firm may
not ordinarily gather itself, and using assumptions about cost allocation that are
unpredictable or with which the firm may disagree. Investigating authorities are not
48
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required to accept everything submitted to them at face value, and will generally insist on
verifying its accuracy, rejecting information that is unverifiable. In that event,
investigating authorities may turn to other sources of information to complete their
analysis, information termed “facts available,” which in practice may involve reliance on
allegations submitted by the domestic industry seeking antidumping duties.49 Exporters
are also to some extent at the mercy of currency fluctuations, which may convert their
prices into dumping prices unexpectedly.50 As a result, it is exceedingly easy for
exporters to find themselves “dumping” notwithstanding their best efforts to avoid it.
Ninth, once an exporter is once found to be dumping and becomes subject to
antidumping duties, it may be exceedingly difficult for that exporter to get out from under
them later. To be sure, the ADA does require investigating authorities to entertain
requests by exporters for reinvestigation if they allege that circumstances justifying the
antidumping duty have changed, and further requires a “sunset review” of antidumping
duties every five years to ascertain whether the removal of the duty would likely lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.51 On what basis may such a
determination be made? In U.S. practice, for example, the fact that dumping continues
after an antidumping duty is in place is treated by the investigating authorities as
evidence strongly supporting the continued need for the duty. Likewise, even if dumping
ceases after a duty is in place, the fact that import volumes decline or fall to zero after the
cessation of dumping is taken to be evidence of the continued need for the duty. Thus,
whether the exporter ceases exports to the United States, raises price to avoid dumping
and then suffers a large but not complete loss of business, or continues dumping to avoid
losing market share, the investigating authorities will likely conclude during the sunset
review that the duty should be maintained. The only case where the authorities will likely
conclude that the duties are unnecessary is where dumping has ceased, and imports of the
goods covered by the duty were steady or rising after the duty was imposed—a scenario
unlikely to materialize very often. The Appellate Body has suggested that this policy is
not on its face inconsistent with the ADA as long as the investigating authorities are
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willing to give proper weight to other considerations that may rebut the inference that
dumping and injury are likely to recur.52
Tenth, antidumping cases may be “settled.” After preliminary findings of
dumping and injury by investigating authorities, exporters may enter “price
undertakings” to revise their prices upward to a level that either eliminates the dumping
fully or avoids its injurious effects.53 From the exporter’s perspective, such agreements
will often be preferable to the imposition of antidumping duties for the obvious reason
that the exporter will retain the price increase, rather than see an antidumping duty paid
by its customers to the importing nation. A fair number of cases are settled in this
fashion, but many are not. Several reasons may be offered. In many instances, exporters
accused of dumping face stiff competition from firms in the importing or a third nation,
which do not face any prospect of antidumping duties. A price undertaking may force
such an exporter out of the market, and its only hope of remaining competitive may be to
proceed to the conclusion of the investigation in the hope of prevailing on the dumping or
injury issues. Related, although the ADA prohibits price undertakings before the
investigating authorities determine preliminarily that dumping and injury are present, in
practice the authorities are unlikely to be interested in pursuing a price undertaking after
final determinations on those issues have been made—the threat of the final
determination exists as a sort of leverage to extract the price undertaking. When the
outcome of the final determination appears uncertain, exporters may not be willing to
offer a price undertaking with which the investigating authorities are satisfied, and may
then prefer to take their chances by pursuing the case to conclusion.54 In addition,
investigating authorities need not accept price undertakings if their negotiation and
administration is deemed impractical, as when a case involves a very large number of
exporters—it is easily possible to imagine that exporters might “cheat” on their price
undertakings, and investigating authorities will tend to reject them unless they are
satisfied with their ability to verify compliance. Further, the investigating authorities will
52
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not accept price undertakings unless a group of exporters accounting for substantially all
of the imports from the country under investigation agree to them, and some of the
exporters may balk (such as those that expect ultimately to demonstrate the absence of
dumping on their part through an individual investigation). Lastly, investigating
authorities might be expected to exhibit some bias against price undertakings, for the
same reason that exporters might prefer them—a price undertaking represents a loss of
revenue from the national treasury to the exporter, relative to an antidumping duty.
***
The remarks above are by no means a complete guide to the ADA. I have
emphasized the substantive aspects of the investigation into the existence and magnitude
of dumping, for example, over the procedural aspects. The ADA contains numerous other
provisions regarding access to proceedings by interested parties, notice and publication of
proceedings and findings, the presentation of evidence and the protection of confidential
information, the requirements for the initiation of investigations, the standing of parties to
seek antidumping duties, and other details regarding the conduct of proceedings and
reviews. The major category of substantive obligations not yet discussed pertains to the
analysis of injury in antidumping cases, the subject of the next section.
Before proceeding, however, note one unique feature of the ADA that must be
borne in mind whenever any controversies arise as to its interpretation. Article 17.6 of the
ADA provides a special standard of review to be applied in WTO antidumping disputes.
In particular, “[w]here the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits
of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure
to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible
interpretations.”
C. The Injury Test under the ADA (and the SCMA)
The so-called “injury test” under WTO law operates more or less identically in
antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. Accordingly, I will address it only
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once in this chapter with particular reference to the ADA—the reader should recognize
that nearly identical provisions exist in the SCMA.55
GATT Art. VI(6)(a) provides that no party shall employ antidumping or
countervailing duties “unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or
subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an
established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a
domestic industry.” The last clause, sometimes termed the “material retardation” test, is
of little importance in practice and I shall dwell on it.56 Virtually all dumping
investigations in practice are focused instead on the question whether dumped imports are
a cause of current or threatened material injury.
To answer this question, investigating authorities must begin by determining the
set of domestic producers who compete with the imports under investigation. This yields
the “definition of domestic industry” in the parlance of ADA Art. 4, and is an exercise
somewhat akin to (though imperfectly) the task of defining the relevant market in
antitrust cases. In general, the domestic industry is to be defined as the “domestic
producers as a whole of the like products.” The concept of the “like product” thus appears
in the injury context too (recall that the price-to-price comparisons for computing a
dumping margin are to the properly adjusted prices of home-market or third-country “like
products”), and the definition of the term noted earlier applies equally here. It is
permissible to exclude from the domestic industry any companies that are “related” to the
exporters under investigation.57 In exceptional cases where competition is highly
regionalized within the territory of the importing nation, such that producers in one
region sell little or none of their production in other regions, it is also permissible to
define two or more regional industries and to impose limited antidumping duties if only
one of them satisfy the injury test.58 Finally, the members of a customs union or free trade
area may define a single industry encompassing all of their territories.59
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Art. 4.1 makes some allowance for the possibility that the number of domestic
producers may be vast, making it difficult to survey them all in assessing injury—thus, it
is enough to include “those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a
major proportion of the total domestic production.” Art. 3.6 makes a related allowance
for data issues that may arise in the assessment of injury. If it is not possible to obtain
reliable data limited to the domestic production of the like product, the injury analysis
may be based on an “examination of the production of the narrowest group or range of
products, which includes the like product, for which the necessary information can be
provided.”
Once the industry is defined, investigating authorities must then determine
whether “the effect of the dumping…is such as to cause or threaten material injury” to
that industry. GATT Art. VI(6). ADA Art. 3.1 elaborates by stating that a determination
of injury must rest on an “an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped
imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like
products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such
products.” The differences in language relate partly to a longstanding debate under U.S.
law as to whether a causal link must be drawn between material injury and dumping, or
only between material injury and dumped imports. The difference between the two may
not be obvious, but consider the following illustration: Suppose that exporters under
investigation have a 20% market share in the importing nation, and that all of their
imports are dumped at a margin of only 2%, just above the de minimis threshold. If one
focuses on the large market share, it may be easy to conclude that the effect of the
dumped imports on domestic producers is material. If one focuses instead on the small
dumping margin, however, one might in some cases conclude that the effect of dumping
is not material, in the sense that a 2% change in the price of the imports might have little
impact. ADA Art. 3 seems deliberately designed to perpetuate the debate over the proper
standard. Art. 3.2–3.5 refers repeatedly to effects caused by “dumped imports.” And with
regard to the size of the dumping margin, Art 3.4 simply lists it as one of “relevant
economic factors and indices” that must be part of the “evaluation” by the investigating
authorities. But Art. 3.5 then provides: “It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports
are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury
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within the meaning of this Agreement.” The second clause seems to require a causal link
to dumping, while the third undercuts that interpretation by referring back to paragraphs 2
and 4, which refer only to the effects of “dumped imports.” At this writing, the Appellate
Body has yet to weigh in on the issue.
Otherwise, the central approach of ADA Art. 3 is to require that certain factors be
taken into account by investigating authorities in their analysis of injury, without saying
how much weight they should be given, or how as a methodological matter their
“consideration” is to proceed. Paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 are the key provisions:
“3.2 With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating
authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped
imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the
importing Member. With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the
investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product
of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to
depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise
would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors
can necessarily give decisive guidance.
3.4 The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic
industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors
and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and
potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on
investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the
magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash
flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or
investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors
necessarily give decisive guidance.
3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of
dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of
this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped
imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination
of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine
any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are
injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must
not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this
respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping
prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade
restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic
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producers, developments in technology and the export performance and
productivity of the domestic industry.”
Art. 3.2 lists factors that will be quite familiar to U.S. antidumping lawyers, as
they have been central to decisions by the U.S. ITC for many years. An increasing
volume or market share for the dumped imports weighs in favor of a finding of injury,
particularly if the increases are correlated with declining prosperity for the domestic
industry. Such analysis is subject, of course, to the objection that such correlation does
not prove causation, doubly so if a causal link is required to dumping. The search for
price undercutting by dumped imports is also a commonplace, even though such price
differentials may simply reflect the fact that the dumped imports are lower quality
products that must sell for less in equilibrium. The question whether dumped imports
have suppressed domestic prices is a more logical question to ask from an economic
standpoint, although nothing is said about how that question should be answered. In
practice, investigating authorities may rely heavily once again on a simple correlation
between import quantities or prices on the one hand, and domestic prices on the other.
Art. 3.4 merely lists a number of factors that must be evaluated by the
investigating authorities in deciding whether injury is present, again without saying how
or indicating how much weight each should receive. WTO antidumping disputes to date
make clear, however, that investigating authorities would be wise to ensure that they
expressly “consider” every factor, along with any others brought to their attention by
parties to the investigation.60
In addition to the confusing phrasing regarding the requisite causal link discussed
above, Art. 3.5 contains the “nonattribution” requirement of the ADA. Again without
saying how the investigating authorities are to perform the task, the investigating
authorities must “examine” all of the “known factors” that are causing injury to the
domestic industry, and ensure that such injury is not attributed to dumped imports.61
Investigating authorities may indeed run afoul of this provision if a known factor is
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before them and they do not provide adequate evidence that it has been “considered,” or
that its effects have somehow been separated from the effects of dumped imports.62
I note in passing that nothing in Article 3 clearly speaks to an issue that has
divided ITC Commissioners under U.S. law—the choice between “bifurcated” and
“unitary” injury analysis. “Bifurcated’ analysis first asks whether the domestic industry is
suffering “material injury,” i.e., some degree of distress, in an absolute sense. Only if the
answer to that question is yes does the analysis proceed to the second stage and inquire
into the cause of the material injury. “Unitary” analysis does not search for indicia of
distress relative to normal times, but instead simply asks whether the domestic industry
would be materially better off without the dumping (or dumped imports). Hence, unitary
analysis might find injury to an industry that is “healthy” in an absolute sense. My
reading of the ADA suggests that both approaches are permissible, although the issue has
not been raised in WTO dispute proceedings at this writing.
Two other provisions in ADA Art. 3 warrant a mention. Art. 3.3 allows for what
is generally termed “cumulation.” When a dumping investigation involves imports from
only one country, it is understood that all exporters from the country may be aggregated
for purposes of examining, for example, the volume of dumped imports, even if the
exporters will later receive individual margins and duties. Art. 3.3 authorizes a similar
practice for purposes of injury analysis when the investigation covers exporters from
more than one country. Their exports may be “cumulated” if the exporters from each
nation have a non-de minimis dumping margin, the quantity of imports from each nation
is not “negligible,” and a “cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is
appropriate in light of the conditions of competition.” The effect of cumulation, of
course, is that exporters from countries with small volumes of exports may be swept into
an investigation, and ultimately subjected to duties, even though the investigating
authorities might not consider them to have a material impact on the domestic industry if
viewed in isolation. Likewise, cumulation may result in the imposition of duties on
exporters whose exports have been declining, and might not be viewed as sufficiently
correlated with decline in the domestic industry if analyzed in isolation.
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Finally, Art. 3.7–3.8 add some special provisions regarding affirmative
determinations of injury based on threatened injury alone. Such cases are to be decided
with “special care,” the threatened injury must be “clearly foreseen and imminent,” and
the investigating authorities must address four additional factors as part of their analysis.
WTO decisions to date do indicate that dispute panels may take a particularly hard look
at the investigating authorities’ reasoning when an affirmative injury finding rests solely
on threat.63
The reader may well have noted that the ADA leaves much open, including the
basic methodological approach to injury analysis in dumping cases. National authorities
often proceed quite loosely, relying as noted on simple correlations and other
economically questionable methods for drawing a causal link between dumping and
injury. A number of economic commentators have suggested ways to give the analysis of
injury more structure and coherence. See Boltuck (1991); Kaplan (1991); Knoll (1989);
Murray and Rousslang (1989). Although these proposals differ in some particulars, the
thrust of each is to suggest that investigating authorities use some form of econometric or
simulation modeling to estimate the impact of dumping quantitatively. Given
econometric estimates or otherwise plausible assumptions about the magnitude of
dumping, the quantity of dumped imports in the market, the elasticity of domestic supply
and demand, the elasticity of the supply of nondumped imports, and the degree of
substitutability between imports and domestic products, computer models can generate
estimates about the impact of dumping on domestic production and prices, and can be
expanded to yield results about other relevant variables in the domestic industry as well
(e.g., employment). The Office of Economics at the U.S. ITC has produced simulation
results based on such modeling exercises quite regularly, although few Commissioners
have relied heavily on them in their analysis.
Widespread adoption and reliance on such methods would, if done carefully,
bring much more economic coherence to the assessment of injury by national
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authorities.64 It is not obvious, however, that economic coherence in injury analysis is of
any particular utility—for reasons that the next section will elaborate, antidumping policy
itself is of dubious economic value, and one may doubt whether a more coherent
implementation of only one aspect of that policy will improve it. In particular, recall that
the injury test requires nothing more than “material injury,” which is understood to
impose a fairly low threshold for an affirmative finding (contrast “serious injury” in the
safeguards area). It will be an extremely rare instance in which a simulation exercise does
not show some adverse impact of dumping on domestic prices and production. Might
investigating authorities that are otherwise inclined to decide in favor of the domestic
industry not simply label the effect as “material” and declare victory? Would the
Appellate Body second guess a determination that injury is “material” if investigating
authorities otherwise jump through all the hoops? For those who believe that antidumping
policy ought be curtailed, it is not clear whether economically rigorous injury analysis
would help or hinder. Sykes (1996) develops this theme at length.
This last observation raises another general issue. Because the injury test is so
loosely framed under WTO law, and the findings by investigating authorities rest on
analysis that is quite malleable, one might wonder whether the whole exercise in the end
turns on political considerations rather than on any economic “merits.” Finger, Hall and
Nelson (1982) hint at an affirmative answer to this question. Anderson (1993) responds in
the negative.
D. Economic Commentary on Antidumping Policy
Antidumping law found an early friend in the respected economist Jacob Viner.
Viner (1923) introduced a distinction that survived for some time in the literature
between “sporadic” dumping, “short-run” dumping, and “permanent” dumping.
“Sporadic” dumping was extremely short-lived, as for the purpose of disposing of a
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The models used in practice do not explicitly identify the effects of other “known factors,” and it is not
entirely clear whether they might be perceived as running afoul of the “nonattribution” requirement as
described in the cases. See United States–Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products
from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (2001). Logically, they simulate the partial equilibrium effect of a change in
dumping alone, and so would not attribute to dumping injury caused by other factors. Whether the
Appellate Body would accept this point as satisfactory “nonattribution” reasoning is unclear. If the
investigating authorities must also quantify in systematic fashion the effects of all other “known factors,”
the costs of proceeding in an economically careful fashion rise dramatically.

42

temporary overstock, and Viner viewed it as benign even if an irritant to competitors.
“Permanent” dumping is continuous over a period of many years, as perhaps when the
home market is protected from competition but export markets are competitive, and
Viner believed here that the gains to consumers from such dumping would outweigh the
losses for domestic firms. But where dumping is “short-run”—of significant but not
indefinite duration—Viner believed that the injury to the domestic industry might be
severe, and might outweigh the gains to consumers. That prospect was acute when the
domestic industry would be driven out of business and exporters would later enjoy a
monopoly, but Viner did not believe that outcome necessary for short-run dumping to be
harmful. He argued that even if prices do not rise above their previous levels after
dumping ceases, a net loss is likely to arise because short-run dumping leads domestic
workers and firms to sit around idle while waiting for it to stop.
Viner further believed that much dumping was of the short-run variety. He noted
correctly that prices below long run average costs of production are by definition
unsustainable (although the short-run can last many years). He evidently believed that
price discrimination dumping (prices below home-market or third-country prices) is also
likely to be temporary, although a clear explanation for that belief is lacking. Modern
economics suggests that price discrimination dumping (when it is deliberate rather than
accidental) will tend to occur mainly because exporters face different demand elasticities
in different markets—firms with market power will sell at higher prices in markets where
demand is less elastic. The home market price can be higher, for example, for no other
reason than the fact that it has a higher protective tariff, allowing firms to charge more in
their home markets. There is no reason to think that this situation is necessarily short-run.
Nevertheless, on the basis of his twin premises—that short-run dumping was injurious to
the importing nation, and that most dumping was short-run—Viner argued that dumping
in general should be condemned.
Viner wrote in the early days of modern microeconomics, and made no attempt to
formalize his argument or to identify carefully the assumptions necessary for it be true.
Modern economists find the analysis questionable. If factor markets clear at competitive
prices and if expectations regarding the duration of dumping are rational, one would
expect resources to remain idle in response to short run dumping only if that is their best
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expected use under the circumstances. The loss to the owners of those resources should
be smaller than the gain to consumers for much the same reasons that yield efficiency in
any competitive equilibrium. Viner’s argument requires some market imperfection or
error in expectations that prevents efficient adjustment to temporarily cheap imports, and
he gives us no reason to expect that such problems will arise routinely. Likewise, and
even more importantly, if the government is to have the capacity to take corrective
measures sensibly, it must be able to identify industries suffering from these market
failures. Certainly, nothing in the antidumping law itself requires a search for indicia of
these market imperfections. The modern economic literature on choice of policy
instruments also casts doubt on the soundness of Viner’s position. If the difficulty lies
with some imperfection in the labor market that leads to inefficiently long periods of
unemployment, for example, the modern literature would suggest that the proper policy
instrument is direct intervention in the labor market, as perhaps with a wage subsidy.
Since the work of Viner, the positive and normative economics of dumping and
antidumping measures have received a great deal of further study. On the positive side,
new reasons for the existence of dumping have been identified, such as various kinds of
uncertainty across markets. See, e.g., Ethier (1982). Dumping within industries that fit the
“strategic trade” models has also been exhaustively analyzed. See, e.g., Gruenspecht
(1988), Dick (1991).
On the normative side, the weight of modern commentary has been highly critical
of antidumping policy. It is generally argued that the only plausibly useful function of the
antidumping laws from an efficiency standpoint is the avoidance of predatory pricing and
monopolization by foreign firms. Many commentators note that this objective can be
accomplished through the antitrust laws without the need for a separate antidumping law.
More importantly, antidumping law is not simply redundant of antitrust policy.
Price discrimination dumping (when deliberate) likely occurs in most instances because
of differences in demand elasticities, as noted, and not because of predation. Sales below
“constructed value” are commonplace in many markets as well, particularly when
demand is weak or new competitors have entered. Hence, investigating authorities will
find dumping in circumstances where firms are in no way embarked on a campaign of
monopolization. Likewise, if the underlying concern were for monopolization,
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antidumping measures would be restricted to concentrated markets exhibiting entry and
reentry barriers so that a monopolistic outcome is plausible. Nothing in the modern
definition of dumping or the injury test imposes such a restriction. See, e.g., Barcelo
(1972); Deardorff (1993); Hindley and Messerlin (1996): Ordover, Sykes and Willig
(1983).
If modern antidumping law is badly tailored for addressing any bona fide
problem, it is nevertheless worth noting that antidumping duties may, in same instances,
yield economic benefits by coincidence. At least three scenarios may be identified in
which such benefits may arise.
First, taking a global welfare perspective, antidumping duties will to some degree
discourage international price discrimination. Much as the domestic welfare effects of
imperfect price discrimination are indeterminate, so are its effects across global markets,
and it is possible that global welfare will increase because antidumping policy reduces
the degree of output constriction by firms with market power. Of course, the opposite
outcome is also possible. Second, from a national welfare perspective, antidumping
duties may benefit large nations that are not already charging their “optimal tariff.” The
logic here is that large nations have a degree of monopsony power, and can exploit it
through tariffs that extract rents from foreign exporters by inducing them to lower their
prices. Antidumping duties might by chance yield a welfare gain to a large importing
nation (but not the world as a whole) for this reason, although again the opposite outcome
is certainly possible. Third, in industries fitting the strategic trade paradigm—an industry
that exhibits increasing returns to scale that can eventually earn monopoly rents at the
expense of foreign consumers, or that generates positive externalities that do not cross
national borders—it is well known that protection can enhance national economic
welfare. See Gruenspecht (1988), Dick (1991). There is no reason to think that a duty
equal to the margin of dumping calculated under existing law is the best duty for this
purpose, of course, and the law applies antidumping measures to all industries, most of
which do not plausibly fit the strategic trade paradigm. But one cannot exclude the
possibility that in some cases, antidumping duties generate these types of benefits by
chance. Sykes (1998) and Willig (1998) offer a more detailed treatment of these issues.
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Some commentators have offered what might be termed “political” defenses of
antidumping policy. One possibility is that whenever trade is perceived to be “unfair,”
governments will be induced to restrict it, and that it is better to do so through measures
that eliminate only the perceived unfairness than through measures that go even farther.
This is the essence of Jagdish Bhagwati’s argument for countermeasures against
subsidized imports, as I understand him, an argument that might be extended to dumped
imports if they too are genuinely perceived as “unfair.” Bhagwati (1988). A difficulty
with such an argument is that it is not clear why dumping should be perceived as unfair,
given that it is really quite a normal business practice for many foreign and domestic
firms.
A related, though seemingly distinct, argument for antidumping measures is the
suggestion that they redirect pressures for protection away from the legislature and into a
more benign administrative process. Boltuck and Litan (1991) observe: “[T]he imperfect
success with which domestic interests have pursued unfair trade remedies suggests
perhaps the only principled reasons for the statutes: as a legal ‘safety valve’ for
channeling the strongest claimants for protection away from overtly supporting more
transparent forms of protection.” The administrative process that doles out antidumping
remedies, the argument runs, will ultimately give less protection than would arise if the
interest groups seeking protection were to turn to the legislature for more conventional
protectionist intervention. A difficulty with this argument is that it is hard to see why the
interest groups who, by hypothesis, could secure a greater degree of protection from the
legislature in the absence of the administrative remedy, will be forced to settle for the
lesser degree of protection that the administrative remedy provides. An alternative
hypothesis is that groups with the power to secure high levels of protection from the
legislature will do so notwithstanding the administrative alternative, and that groups
without such power will avail themselves of the administrative route, thereby increasing
the total amount of protection in the end. Put differently, it seems problematic to argue
that if an additional avenue for interest groups to secure protection is opened while
previous avenues also remain open, the net result will be a reduction in protection. Of
course, if antidumping measures were somehow restricted or abolished, it is surely right
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to say that the resources devoted to the pursuit of antidumping duties would be redirected
elsewhere and that unintended consequences might result.
If the bulk of the modern normative commentary is correct in suggesting that
antidumping policy is economically unsound, however, a positive puzzle arises: Why do
trading nations not agree to eliminate the use of antidumping duties, much as they have
negotiated to reduce their tariffs generally? Occasional proposals within the WTO system
to eliminate antidumping policy and subsume it within a sensible competition policy have
had little traction. What explains the persistent popularity and survivability of
antidumping policy? Sykes (1998) offers the suggestion that the political constituency for
antidumping policy is not (and never has been) an anti-monopoly constituency, but is
instead much the same as the political constituency for safeguard measures—declining
industries. Because of the injury test, the principal beneficiaries of antidumping duties are
industries that have difficulty competing in open markets. These industries present an
effective lobby for protection for reasons noted earlier, and as yet the exporters targeted
by antidumping measures have proven ineffective in political opposition.
Part of the reason why may lie in the fact that at least some exporters may not be
harmed by antidumping actions against them. If they are able to settle the case through a
price undertaking, they will have raised price and restricted output much like a cartel.
Prusa (1992) and Staiger and Wolak (1989) argue that antidumping policy can indeed
provide a government-sponsored route to cartelization that would otherwise violate the
antitrust laws. This outcome is not observed in all cases by any means, since many cases
are not settled. But the fact that it occurs some of the time no doubt has bearing on the
ongoing political equilibrium.
Finally, it is interesting to note that antidumping policy may disappear as trading
economies become more integrated. The U.S. federal system has some restrictions on
domestic price discrimination in the Robinson-Patman Act, but they have always been
much more closely linked to antitrust concerns and are not nearly as intrusive on pricing
policies as international antidumping rules. Indeed, the Robinson-Patman Act is hardly
ever enforced. Similarly, the formation of the European Union eventually led to the
abolition of antidumping law internally. By contrast, NAFTA assiduously preserves the
right of members to take antidumping measures against other members, as did the
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predecessor U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. An understanding of the political
reasons for this heterogeneity in regional arrangements may also illuminate the reasons
for the current state of the law in the WTO.
III. Countervailing Duties
The WTO system takes a two-track approach to the discipline of subsidies. First,
subsidies may directly violate WTO law, which now contains elaborate rules limiting the
ability of governments to engage in certain subsidy practices. For nonagricultural
products, these rules are contained in the SCMA; for agricultural products, they are
contained in the Agreement on Agriculture. These direct limitations on subsidy practices
are discussed in the chapter by Trebilcock and Fishbein elsewhere in this volume.
Readers seeking a more elaborate discussion may wish to consult Sykes (2005).
Second, WTO/GATT law has always permitted members to take countermeasures
against imported goods65 that benefit from “subsidies,” and that cause or threaten
material injury to import-competing firms. These “countervailing duties” are part of the
trade remedy arsenal, and will be the final subject of this chapter.
Note that the injury requirement for the use of countervailing duties is virtually
identical to that for the use of antidumping duties, both substantively and procedurally. I
thus refer the reader to the discussion of injury analysis in the last section and will not
address it further here. Likewise, the procedural requirements for national countervailing
duty investigations, and for the collection and periodic review of countervailing duties,
are nearly identical to those for antidumping investigations, and I will not dwell on them.
The focus of this section is on what constitutes a countervailable subsidy, how the
subsidy is measured, and whether countervailing duties make economic sense.

A. Countervailable Subsidies under WTO Law
Countervailing duty law dates back to the first U.S legislation in 1897. The U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930 strengthened the law, authorizing the Department of the Treasury to
impose duties to offset any “bounty or grant” bestowed on imported merchandise. Article
65

The GATS commits members to negotiate regarding subsidies in Article XV, but as of yet little has been
accomplished, and I will focus here entirely on the rules governing goods markets.
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VI of the original GATT was drafted in 1947 to permit the continuing use of
countervailing duties, providing in paragraph two that “[n]o countervailing duty shall be
levied on any product…in excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy
determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or
export of such product,” and adding an injury requirement in paragraph six.
U.S. law did not attempt to define the term “bounty or grant,” and GATT likewise
left open the definition of “bounty or subsidy.” Early U.S. cases generally involved what
are now termed “export subsidies,” which entail government payments or other
incentives contingent on exportation (for example, a government program providing that
producers will receive one shilling for each widget that they export). Later cases imposed
duties to offset what are now termed “domestic subsidies,” which entail government
payments or other benefits to domestic producers that are not contingent on exportation
(for example, a government program providing that producers will receive one shilling
for each widget that they produce). WTO law now recognizes that both types of programs
may produce countervailable subsidies.
1. The Concept of “Subsidy” in the SCMA
The Uruguay Round SCMA undertook for the first time to provide a definition of
“subsidy” under WTO law, drawing heavily on the evolution of the concept under U.S.
law. Article 1 defines “subsidy” as a “financial contribution” by a government or any
other public body within the territory of a member. The contribution can arise from a
direct transfer of funds, from revenue otherwise due that is foregone, from government
provision of goods or services “other than general infrastructure,” from government
purchases, from government support for a funding mechanism that makes any such
contributions, or from certain income or price support schemes. The government
contribution must also confer a “benefit”—government purchases of goods or services at
fair market value, for example, would not result in any benefit.
Not all “subsidies” within this definition may be the subject of countervailing
duties. In addition to the injury requirement, the subsidy must also be “specific.” The
“specificity test” has its origins in U.S. law, and has long been a source of controversy.
Very roughly, the function of the specificity test is to distinguish familiar activities of
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governments that are considered acceptable and in no way “unfair,” from other activities
that somehow confer an unfair advantage on the beneficiary. The essential premise of the
test is that narrowly-targeted programs (and export-contingent or import-substitution
programs) are more troublesome than those that are more broadly available in the
economy. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 2.3, all subsidies contingent in law or in fact
on export performance are automatically “specific,” as are subsidies that are contingent
on the use of domestic over imported goods. For other programs that fit the definition of
“subsidy” in Article 1, “specificity” is present when the beneficiaries of the subsidy are
limited to “an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.” This situation
can arise when the granting authority or the legislation that it administers expressly limits
the beneficiaries to “certain enterprises,” or can occur when the subsidy is de facto
specific. A finding of de facto specificity may result from the “use of a subsidy
programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain
enterprises, [or] the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain
enterprises.” In addition, a subsidy that is “limited to certain enterprises located within a
designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be
specific.”
The definition of specificity under WTO law leaves open a most fundamental
issue—how narrowly targeted must a subsidy be to be deemed limited to a “group of
enterprises or industries?” This text on its face is quite useless at delimiting the scope of
the relevant “group,” and to date WTO dispute cases provide little guidance on the
subject.
2. Measurement Issues
Once a subsidy is found to be specific, its value must be computed in relation to
the value of the subsidized merchandise in order to compute an appropriate
countervailing duty. Sometimes this exercise is fairly straightforward. For example, if
widget producers in an exporting nation receive a one shilling grant for each exported
widget and the value of an exported widget is ten shillings, then a 10% duty is
appropriate to “countervail” the export subsidy. Likewise, if widget producers receive a
two shilling grant for every widget produced, and each widget is worth ten shillings, then
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the proper duty is 20% to countervail the domestic subsidy. Producers receiving both
subsidies would properly be subject to a countervailing duty of 30%.
Often, however, valuation of the subsidy is more complicated. Suppose the
subsidy takes the form of a loan or loan guarantee, an equity infusion, a special tax
provision, or the sale of goods by the government—how is the subsidy to be measured in
such cases? The SCMA begins with the premise that the relevant “benefit’ is the benefit
to the recipient (see Article 14), as distinguished from the cost to the government. Thus, a
loan to a firm at a below market rate would confer a “benefit,” even if the government
could borrow funds itself at an even lower rate, and thus argue that it earns a “profit” on
the loan.
When feasible, the benefit to the recipient will be measured by a market
benchmark. Thus, for a loan by the government, the benefit must ordinarily be assessed
with reference to the interest rate that the recipient would pay on a comparable
commercial loan in the private market. For a loan guarantee, the question is whether the
guarantee results in interest savings to the recipient in excess of the price paid to the
government for the loan guarantee. When the government sells goods and services, the
question is whether the government has sold them for less than the private market would
charge in the same country. When the government infuses equity into domestic firms, the
question becomes whether it has behaved in a manner inconsistent with what private
investors would do under similar circumstances.66
Market benchmarks, however, are not always available. The tax issue presents an
obvious example—when a firm benefits from a special provision in a tax law, it makes no
sense to ask how much tax the firm would instead pay in a “private market.” Rather, the
standard benchmark looks to the taxes that the firm would otherwise pay. Although such
an approach sounds sensible, it leads to some arguably peculiar results. Imagine a widget
industry in a country that has no corporate income tax at all. Such an industry receives no
tax “benefit.” By contrast, consider a widget industry that is exempted from corporate
income tax in a country that applies a corporate income tax to other industries. That
industry would receive a “benefit” in the amount of the foregone taxes on its income,

66

See generally SCMA Article 14.
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even though it pays exactly the same tax (zero) as the other hypothetical widget industry
that receives no tax “benefit.”
Market benchmarks may also prove unavailable in countries that do not have
private markets. The United States, for example, has long taken the position that the
countervailing duty laws cannot be coherently applied to nonmarket economies. [It has
more than made up for its “generosity” on this front, however, through aggressive
application of antidumping law to nonmarket economies.]
Finally, market benchmarks may prove problematic if the government subsidy
program is so extensive that it can be said to have “distorted” the private market. In the
long-running dispute between the United States and Canada over alleged subsidization of
lumber exports by Canada, the United States has claimed that subsidized prices for
standing timber on crown lands have depressed prices for all timber in Canada.67 Thus,
argues the United States, the price of private timber is not the proper benchmark for
measuring the amount of the government timber subsidy. In a subsequent WTO
proceeding, the Appellate Body accepted the notion that, in principle, private market
prices in the subsidizing may be distorted by subsidy programs and an alternative
benchmark may become necessary.68
Several other recurrent issues warrant a mention. First, the valuation of subsidies
can involve complicated allocation issues, across products and over time. Suppose that a
one-time below-market loan is used to build a multi-product factory. If only one of the
products of the factory is subject to a countervailing duty investigation, say, it will be
necessary to determine what portion of the subsidy “benefits” the production of that
particular product. Likewise, if the factory has a useful life of a number of years, it will
be necessary to decide how much of the subsidy “benefits” the production of the product
in any window of time. Such questions are typically answered with complex allocation
rules that may rest on somewhat arbitrary assumptions.69
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Canada has forcefully disputed this proposition, to be sure, arguing that a below market price for
standing timber on government lands will not affect the size of the harvest, and thus the price of competing
timber on private land.
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See United States–Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (2004).
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For further discussion of such issues and the way that they are handled under U.S. law, see 19 C.F.R.
§§351.504 et. seq.
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Second, difficult issues may arise when a subsidy is bestowed at one stage of
processing, while the exported good is produced by a later stage of processing. One must
then ask whether the “upstream” subsidy “passes through” to the later stage of
processing. When both stages of processing are integrated into a single company, the
tendency is to assume that the subsidy passes through in full. But what if the recipient of
the subsidy sells its goods at arm’s-length to another company that processes them further
and then exports the finished product? Again drawing on the softwood lumber dispute for
illustration, the Appellate Body has faulted the United States for failing to conduct a
proper analysis of whether timber subsidies given to loggers pass through to unaffiliated
sawmills that purchase the logs and manufactured them into lumber.70
Third, privatization transactions can raise difficult questions regarding alleged
subsidies to the owners of privatized assets. Suppose that a government builds an
uneconomical steel mill, for example, seeking to prop up local employment.
Subsequently, the government auctions the mill for as much as the market will bear. Can
the new owner be deemed “subsidized,” or is he immune from such a finding on the
grounds that he paid fair market value for the assets and thereby received no “benefit?” In
two recent decisions, the Appellate Body leans strongly toward the latter view.71
Grossman and Mavroidis (2003) question the logic of that approach, which implies that a
government can build uneconomic productive capacity in an industry and then “cleanse”
the assets of any subsidy by selling them at arm’s length, even though the uneconomic
plants will thereafter continue to operate and cause the same harm to foreign competitors.
Finally, because countervailing duties offset subsidies that are commonly granted
to an entire industry, it has been commonplace for national authorities to compute a
single rate of duty for all exporters in a given exporting nation. Article 19.3 of the SCMA
affords an opportunity for individual exporters to seek an individual rate, however, noting
the possibility that some exporters may renounce subsidies, while others may enter price
undertakings to avoid the application of countervailing duties, akin to the undertakings
available in antidumping cases. Differential rates of duty may also arise when the
70
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from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (2004).
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See United States–Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (2000); United States–Countervailing
Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R (2002).
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granting authority is a subsidiary government—in the softwood lumber case, for
example, the United States has computed different duties for each Canadian province
because most of the alleged subsidy programs are administered at the provincial level.
B. Economic Commentary on Countervailing Duties
In contrast to the generally hostile view of antidumping measures taken by most
modern economists, commentary on countervailing duties is more mixed. Critics such as
Sykes (1989) begin with the observation that subsidized (and thus cheaper) imports are
generally beneficial to an importing nation—regardless of the reason why imports are
cheap, an improvement in the terms of trade will yield an aggregate gain in national
economic welfare, other things being equal. Likewise, the welfare effect of
countervailing duties will often be adverse, much like the welfare effect of any other
tariff. This view counsels openness to subsidized imports, and indeed suggests that
perhaps the proper policy response is to “send a thank-you note to the embassy” as Paul
Krugman once quipped.
To be sure, special circumstances may arise in which countervailing duties yield a
benefit to the importing nation. Two possibilities, noted earlier in the discussion of
antidumping duties, are that countervailing duties allow the extraction of monopsony
rents by a large nation with market power over the price of its imports, or that they afford
useful protection to an industry that fits the “strategic trade” paradigm. But nothing in
WTO law (or national law) limits countervailing duties to the cases where such benefits
plausibly arise. Further, the gains to an importing nation from exploiting its monopsony
power or from protecting its strategic industries come at the expense of its trading
partners, and global welfare can decline if all nations pursue such policies.
Defenders of countervailing duty law, by contrast, such as Jackson (1997), urge
that countervailing duties may serve as a useful deterrent to wasteful subsidy practices. It
is well known that government subsidies can distort market outcomes and divert
resources away from higher-valued uses. The problem can become all the more acute
when political pressure exists for governments to match the subsidies granted by others—
many governments may find themselves subsidizing the same sectors, collectively
wasting resources while accomplishing little to provide net benefits to the subsidy
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recipients. See Hufbauer and Erb (1984). A threat of countervailing duties, the argument
runs, will discourage such wasteful practices. The benefits of countervailing duty law
thus arise not in the cases where duties are actually employed, but in the cases where
subsidies are never bestowed in the first instance. Likewise, even if the actual use of a
countervailing duty by an importing nation lowers its welfare when viewed narrowly, the
broader systemic benefits from the discouragement of wasteful subsidies by a prospect of
countervailing duties may make all nations better off on balance.
This more optimistic view may be correct, but there are several reasons to
question it. First, and rather trivially, a tradeoff exists between the welfare costs that can
arise in cases where duties are actually used, and any welfare gains that arise in other
cases from the discouragement of wasteful subsidy practices. It is not obvious a priori
how the balance is struck in practice.
Second, and related, there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of countervailing
duties as a deterrent to wasteful subsidy practices. Countervailing duties are unilateral
policies undertaken by importing nations without coordination. When the United States
imposes a countervailing duty on a product from another country, for example, it will
often be the only country in the trading system to impose a countervailing duty on that
product. The subsidized goods may simply be diverted to another market, and in any case
the damage to the beneficiary of the subsidy may be quite modest in relation to the value
of the subsidy. The use of countervailing duties is also limited by the injury test. One can
question whether the prospect of uncoordinated countermeasures, limited to situations of
demonstrable injury, will do much to discourage subsidization.
Third, the ability of countervailing duties to discourage wasteful subsidies turns
importantly on the ability of the law to distinguish the subsidies that are “wasteful.” The
specificity test may be a questionable basis for sorting cases in this respect. Broad
subsidies to agricultural producers, for example, may be “nonspecific” because they
benefit more than a “group” of industries, even though the agricultural sector is widely
considered to be distorted by subsidies in many countries. More generally, nations may
be able to exploit the specificity test by designing subsidy programs to be broad enough
to avoid running afoul of it. It is also possible that a “specific” subsidy may not be
wasteful. For example, a subsidy to research and development in an industry where
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intellectual property rights are difficult to enforce may have sound economic justification,
yet appear quite “specific.”72 Schwartz and Harper (1972) take this type of criticism a
step further. If a democratic society chooses to divert resources into a particular
industry—such as family farming—who is to say that the program is waste? Perhaps the
program results from a failure of the political process, or perhaps it reflects genuine
preferences of the society for preserving certain activities despite the cost. The general
point is that a simple and administrable criterion to distinguish “waste” from the
legitimate activities of governments may be quite difficult to fashion, and one can
certainly wonder whether the specificity criterion is satisfactory.
Fourth, as Bagwell and Staiger (2002) note, any notion that a subsidy is
“wasteful” must be mindful of the theory of the second best. In a global economy still
pervaded by various trade barriers—tariffs, quotas, and the like—the existing volume of
trade in many products is inefficiently small. Subsidies can increase the volume of trade
toward its “free-trade” ideal, and enhance global welfare, other things being equal.
Fifth, and again related, countervailing duty laws invariably examine subsidy
programs in isolation. Firms are subject to a wide array of tax, regulatory and possibly
subsidy policies. All of these have the potential to distort the behavior of the firm relative
to some ideal, “free-market” benchmark, and many of the distortions may be offsetting.
Ideally, a subsidy program should be deemed “wasteful” only if it induces a net diversion
of resources into the subsidized activity relative to a proper benchmark. But the task of
determining the net impact of government on the position of a firm or industry relative to
a proper benchmark would be Herculean, and so countervailing duty law generally
ignores most government burdens that might offset the benefits of a subsidy. For this
reason as well, the notion that countervailing duties as computed in practice will
appropriately target “wasteful” subsidies and leave constructive government activities
alone seems quite dubious.
One last strand of literature warrants a quick note. WTO law does not clearly
require an importing nation to demonstrate that a subsidy program has caused injury to its
producers before imposing a countervailing duty. It is arguably enough that the subsidy
has conferred a “benefit,” is specific, and that the “subsidized imports” have caused
72
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injury.73 Some commentators have suggested that this situation leads to an inappropriate
use of countervailing duties in cases where the subsidy has no cross-border impact. For
example, a government might give an unconditional grant to a firm, and the firm might
simply distribute it to shareholders without changing output or prices. Or perhaps the
government might pay a firm to reduce its output (as in certain agricultural schemes),
which raises prices and actually benefits its foreign competitors. To avoid duties in such
cases, Goetz, Granet and Schwartz (1986) and Diamond (1990) advocate legal reforms
that would limit countervailing duties to amounts that offset the adverse cross-border
impact of subsidy programs, roughly, by undertaking to measure the extent to which
subsidy programs lower marginal costs. Critics question the administrative feasibility of
such reforms, among other things, although it is noteworthy that the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture does take some steps toward distinguishing trade-distorting subsidies from
those that arguably do not distort trade. See Sykes (2005).

73

The requisite linkage between injury and subsidization is confounded as in the antidumping area by the
argument that a link to the “subsidized imports” is enough. See the discussion of this issue earlier in this
chapter in the antidumping section.
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